

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** Peter Jacobs <pmjacobs@lbl.gov>

**Subject: Re: ALICE Constitution**

**Date:** 20 August 2016 at 14:09:39 GMT+2

**To:** Sudhir Raniwala <Sudhir.Raniwala@cern.ch>

**Cc:** "pinsky@central.uh.edu" <pinsky@central.uh.edu>, Peter Braun-Munzinger <p.braun-munzinger@gsi.de>, Pietro Antonioli <Pietro.Antonioli@cern.ch>, "Min Jung Kweon" <minjung.kweon@cern.ch>, Lawrence Pinsky <pinsky@uh.edu>, "Adriana Telesca" <Adriana.Telesca@cern.ch>, Jeremy Wilkinson <jeremy.wilkinson@cern.ch>

Hi Sudhir,

Let me note that the structure of the US Congress actually utilizes both kinds of representation:

- the Senate has two members per state, regardless of population
- the House has representation of districts of approximately equal population

It turns out that the Senate is calmer and more deliberative. Large states cannot dominate small states, and results must be achieved by negotiation and consensus.

I think we should bear this in mind when thinking about the CB structure.

Regards,

Peter

On Sat, Aug 20, 2016 at 1:27 AM, Sudhir Raniwala <Sudhir.Raniwala@cern.ch> wrote:

Thanks, Larry, for considering the option.

Maybe the consequences of what I proposed didn't quite surface. Please allow me this one more mail, partly to underline the full impact of the proposal, and partly in response to your mail.

(i) If practicality dictates the policy a priori, then something is lost. I would rather make a policy that is 'good', and then look for methods to implement it well. And then make compromises in the policy only where implementation is (grossly) impractical.

(ii) Proxies: When I assign a proxy (to vote) on my behalf, I let her/him vote for me on ALL issues....those which are pre-determined and those which come up during discussions.

(iii) There are some issues that require greater participation of the collaboration than others.

One discomfoting feature of the present system is that 10 institutes of 3 members each (many of whom may have a small fraction of time being devoted in ALICE) contribute 10 times more to decision making than the 30-member CERN team (where most members may be giving 100% of their time to ALICE). What is proposed reduces this anomaly.

Strategies for implementation of policies can be designed if we see any good in the policy.

Thank you again and with my best,

sudhir

**From:** Lawrence Pinsky [[pinsky@central.uh.edu](mailto:pinsky@central.uh.edu)]

**Sent:** 19 August 2016 21:21

**To:** Sudhir Raniwala

**Cc:** Peter Braun-Munzinger; Pietro Antonioli; Peter Martin Jacobs; Min Jung Kweon; Lawrence Pinsky; Adriana Telesca; Jeremy Wilkinson

**Subject:** Re: ALICE Constitution

Sudhir:

You raise a valid issue, and one that has confronted entities attempting to be "democratic" throughout history.

However, I am unclear as to the details of your proposal. Are you suggesting that the Collaboration Board be open to all members to vote on all issues, or only on elections per se? Also, I believe that given the nature of CB business, trying to provide universal suffrage on all issues is unworkable as a practical matter.

When you say that individual M&O members may send in "proxies," do you mean predetermined actual votes to be recorded on issues? If that is what you are suggesting, then the problem is that many of the votes that come before the CB are not precisely anticipated by the agenda, and as such following a priori instructions from a non-attending collaboration M&O member is practically unworkable.

On the other hand, just giving each CB member a number of votes equal to that institute's M&O number does not achieve universal suffrage because there is no mandate to force any group to be internally democratic.

I personally favor keeping the current format...

Larry

On Aug 19, 2016, at 11:20 AM, Sudhir Raniwala <[Sudhir.Raniwala@cern.ch](mailto:Sudhir.Raniwala@cern.ch)> wrote:

Dear Members of the ALICE Constitution Task-Force

Greetings.

I am taking this liberty to write to you on a matter which may be outside the domain of my rights, at this stage. I shall be grateful if the honourable members of the task force may give it the consideration that it deserves, whatever it be.

We know that there are various units in the collaboration, and some commonly recognised units are

- (i) Institute (as represented by the Team Leader)
- (ii) M&O-A paying member
- (iii) and another (not independent) 'unit'....the 'author' of our publications.

The shift responsibilities are decided by the 'unit' mentioned at (iii): number of authors. Institutes

(Team Leaders) are responsible to fulfil the responsibility.

The M&O-A money contribution is decided by the number of authors (with Ph.D. ....). Again, the team leader, or the funding agencies of the country are responsible to pay that contribution.

Where does the Institute, as a unit, come up in the collaboration activities, other than its representative being a member of collaboration board? A priori, I am unable to see the merit in collaboration board consisting of representatives of each institute in the collaboration. ....may be I am missing something. It is certainly a convenient number for keeping the strength of CB manageable, while intending a democratic functioning. It may be worth recalling that a prerequisite to make the merits of democracy effective is a well-informed electorate. And we know that other engagements or constraints have inhibited many amongst us to be as informed as many others. While the well-informed electorate may be a utopian dream in every organisation, the system can be made more democratic by including votes of all members. After all, an institute is an abstract entity, and the collaboration board needs 'real' members for its working.

Considering the above, I will like to suggest the following:

Let each institute have a vote which is weighted in proportion to the number of its M&O-A paying members. This sounds undemocratic, but in reality is much more democratic....

"The decisions in the collaboration will be taken by all members of the collaboration. The members of the collaboration may send their proxy for the elections. In case there are no proxies, the TeamLeader (or his representative) will vote on behalf of all members of her/his team". Also, all members are equal because all pay equally to M&O-A. In my humble opinion, this is more democratic than one vote for each institute (which, in my humble opinion, is only a logistic convenience).

Thank you for your understanding, and for considering the above mentioned suggestion.

with my kind regards,

Sudhir Raniwala  
Physics Department  
University of Rajasthan  
Jaipur, India